

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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INFO USDEL ASWAN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 1809

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, JO, US
SUBJECT: AIR DEFENSE PACKAGE FOR JORDAN

FOR NEA SOBER FROM PICKERING

ASWAN FOR SERETARY'S PARTY

REFS: (A) JERUSALEM 0488 (SECTO 318)
(B) STATE 054124 (NOTAL)

1. WE WILL LOOK FORWARD TO MATERIAL FOR PRESENTATION
TO JORDANIANS, INCLUDING OPTIONS, IN ADVANCE OF PROPOSED
VISIT BY GENERAL BIN SHAKER TO WASHINGTON. (REFTEL A). THIS WILL
GO FAR TO HELP HANDLING THE AIR DEFENSE ISSUE WITH JORDAN.

2. FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD WE SEE SEVERAL ADDITIONAL
ISSUES WHICH WILL REQUIRE SOME THOUGHT. WE FLAG THEM
NOW NOT TO SEEK IMMEDIATE RESOLUTION, BUT IN THE
HOPES OF COORDINATING OUR OWN THINKING SOMEWHAT
IN ADVANCE OF THE FOLLOWING PROBLEMS AS POSSIBLE AREAS OF
DIFFICULTY.

(A) U.S. RECOMMENDED OPTION IS \$300M PACKAGE WHICH
EXCLUDES HAWKS. FOR \$360M JORDANIANS CAN BUY OPTION B

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IN ALL AREAS WHICH INCLUDES POINT WHICH TEAM MADE HERE THAT

HAWK HAS ADDITIONAL DEFENSE CAPABILITY TO PROTECT DIVISIONS AND SOME AIRBASES/RADAR STATIONS (E.G. MAFRAG AB) FROM MEDIUM TO HIGH ALTITUDE ATTACK WHILE STILL SITED TO PROTECT AMMAN-ZERQA. DECISION IN JORDAN WILL BE HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY COST-BENEFIT RELATIONSHIPS AFTER SEARCHING EXAMINATION.

(B) FOR MORALE PURPOSES GOJ MIGHT CHOOSE TO SACRIFICE CHAPPARAL/VULCAN BATTALION IN EACH DIVISION FOR A LESSER QUANTITY IN ONLY TWO OR THREE DIVISIONS, AT LEAST AT FIRST, AND TILT TOWARD HAWK. THIS WOULD BE TRUE ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF LONG LEAD TIMES STATED FOR CHAPPARAL/VULCAN (36 TO 48 MONTHS AS COMPARED WITH SOMEWHAT BETTER POSSIBILITIES FOR IMPROVED HAWK).

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE FACTORS PRESUMABLY SATISFIED BY STATEMENT IN PAPER THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO PROVIDE HAWK IF JORDAN WANTS IT. THIS WILL BE A KEY ELEMENT OF ANY OFFER WE MAKE.

4. A SECOND ORDER OF PROBLEMS SURROUNDS QUESTION OF OBVIOUS OMISSION OF SHOULDER-FIRED WEAPONS FROM ANY CONSIDERATION IN REPORT. PROBLEM HERE IS COMPOUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MILITARY (TROOPS NEED SOMETHING IN FIELD AND SOON). FINANCIAL (WILL JORDAN GET MORE RABAT PAYMENTS IF U.S. PRODUCES NOTHING FOR THEM -- THIS APPLIES ACROSS THE BOARD TO ALL AD WEAPONS, BUT REDEYE IS LIKELY TO BE PHYSICALLY AVAILABLE SOONEST), AND SECURITY SENSITIVITY (KING WILL BRIDLE MOST AT BEING TOLD HE IS NOT RELIABLE ENOUGH TO BE TRUSTED WITH REDEYE). ISSUE WILL NOT BE SUBLIMATED OR FINESSED WITH JORDANIANS BY NON-CONSIDERATION IN REPORT. WE UNDERSTAND NON-CONSIDERATION WAS MOTIVATED POSSIBLY BY THREE FACTORS:

(A) NO-AVAILABILITY -- U.S. NO LONGER MANUFACTURING REDEYE INVENTORY THEREBY WEAKENING U.S. FORCES BEFORE FOLLOW ON SYSTEM IS PRODUCED AND AVAILABLE;

(B) CONGRESSIONAL AND ISRAELI CONCERNS -- THIS SYSTEM MIGHT BE CRITICIZED AS PROVIDING A SIGNIFICANT AIR DEFENSE FOR JORDAN, PARTICULARLY INER
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CONDITIONS OF PRESENT SENSITIVITY IN CONGRESS AND ISRAEL; (C) DOMINO THEORY -- THAT IF WE GIVE THEM TO JORDAN, THEN LEBANON, SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND OTHERS WILL ALSO HAVE TO HAVE THEM; AND (D) TRUSTWORTHINESS -- IF THEY GO TO JORDAN THEY MIGHT END UP IN WRONG HANDS.

5. IT WILL NOT BE EASY TO TELL JORDANIANS THEY CANNOT HAVE THESE WEAPONS, PARTICULARLY WHEN ISRAEL

IRAN AND OUR NATO ALLIES, SOME OF WHOM ARE NO LONGER
QUITE AS CLOSE TO US AS PREVIOUSLY, HAVE THEM.
(ALSO SYRIANS AND EGYPTIANS HAVE APPARENTLY EQUIVALENT
SOVIET SA-7 WEAPON). BEST COURSE OF ACTION IN ABOVE
CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE TO REVIEW CAREFULLY ARGUMENTS
FOR AND AGAINST AND COME UP WITH MOST ACCEPTABLE
(FROM U.S. AND JORDAN POINT OF VIEW) ARRANGEMENT

6. REGARDING POINTS ABOVE, REDEYE WOULD IN TOKEN
AMOUNTS HELP TO RESOLVE MORALE PROBLEMS. THIS IS NOT
JUST OUR IDEA, BUT HAS BEEN PRETTY CONSTANTLY REPEATED
TO US BY PRIME MINISTER AND CHIEF OF STAFF. IN MANY
WAYS DELIVERY OF 16 TOW LAUNCHERS IN DECEMBER 1973
SERVED SIMILAR PURPOSE ALTHOUGH THEY WERE FAR FROM
ADEQUATE FOR JORDAN'S ANTI-TANK NEEDS. JORDANIANS
ARE CAPABLE, EVEN WITHIN THEIR OWN FORCES, OF
PICKERING

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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HANDLING SUCH ISSUES WITH GOOD SENSE. CONGRESSIONAL
OBJECTIONS TO JORDAN HAVING THESE WEAPONS AND
SIMILARLY THOSE FROM ISRAEL, WILL PALE BY COMPARISON
IF WE ARE SERIOUS IN OFFERING CHAPPARAL/VULCAN AND
HAWK. THE DOMINO PROBLEM IS ALWAYS WITH US. OUR
ARGUMENT WOULD BE STRONGER IF REDEYE WERE NOWHERE
ELSE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. SELECTIVELY GIVEN TO OTHERS

IT LOOKS TO KING LIKE WE REALLY BELIEVE JORDAN CANNOT BE TRUSTED. THERE IS NOTHING WHICH MAKES OUR JORDANIAN FRIENDS MORE IRATE, PARTICULARLY THE KING, THAN TO IMPUTE THAT THEY ARE INSECURE OR WILL BE A CHANNEL FOR REDEYE GETTING TO THE FEDS. WE CAN THINK OF NO ONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, POSSIBLY EXCEPTING THE ISRAELIS, WHO WOULD BE MORE CAREFUL ABOUT THAT HAPPENING. JORDANIANS WOULD OF COURSE WELCOME ANY SECURITY SURVEY PRIOR TO RELEASE OF REDEYE TO DETERMINE AND ADVISE ON IMPROVING THEIR CONTROL IN THIS REGARD.

7. WHAT CAN WE DO TO HANDLE THE REDEYE PROBLEM?

THE OPTIONS INCLUDE:

(A) AN EXPLANATION TO THE KING THAT WE NO LONGER MAKE REDEYE AND CANNOT SPARE IT FROM OUR OWN FORCES, EVEN INTOKEN QUANTITIES TO HELP WITH HIS PROBLEM.

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THIS WILL BE UNHAPPILY RECEIVED AND COULD LEAD HIM TO ACQUIRE SOME SA7'S FROM SYRIA OR THE SOVIETS. I THINK WE WOULD WANT TO CONSIDER THIS QUESTION MOST CAREFULLY:

(B) TELL THE KING WE CAN ONLY MAKE AVAILABLE A MINIMUM NUMBER NOW FROM INVENTORY (25 TO 50) AND THAT WE WILL PROVIDE THE FOLLOW-ON SYSTEM WHEN PRODUCED IN A FEW YEARS TIME. THIS WOULD HAVE A POSITIVEIMPACT AND MEET MOST OF THE PROBLEMS.

(C) A PROMISE TO PROVIDE SOME OF THE FOLLOW-ON SYSTEM FROM LATER PRODUCTION. THIS MIGHT BE LINKED ALSO WITH A WILLINGNESS TO SEE WHAT WE CAN DO IN SPEEDING UP AVAILABILITY OF OTHER SYSTEMS HE MAY WANT -- CHAPPARAL/VULCAN, HAWK F-5E. THIS PROPOSAL WOULD BE LESS SATISFACTORY, PARTICULARLY IF WHAT WE COULD OFFER IN THE WAY OF A SUBSTITUTE OR EARLY DELIVERY OF FOLLOW-ON SYSTEM WOULD NOT BE REALLY EFFECTIVE IN THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS.

8. KING FACES REAL PROBLEMS ON WHAT HE DOES WITH RABAT MONEY IN GAINING NEXT YEAR'S TRANCHE IF HE HAS NOTHING TO SHOW FOR IT EXCEPT A FEW LONG RANGE ORDERS. RABAT FUNDS WERE GIVEN TO GET HIM SOME AIR DEFENSE IN REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME AND PRESSURES WILL BE ON FROM OTHER ARABS ABOUT WHY HE DID NOT GO SOVIETS ON THIS SCORE.

9. WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY COMMENTS OR REACTIONS FROM THE DEPARTMENT ON THE ABOVE. SUBSTANTIVELY, WE BELIEVE THIS ISSUE MUST BE ADDRESSED; TACTICALLY WE DO NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE WE CAN HOLD SUCH OFF UNTIL

AFTER THE VISITS OF JORDANIAN CHIEF OF STAFF (JOINT
COMMISSION MEETING) AND KING, PARTICULARLY SINCE WE WILL
BE PROVIDING THEM WITH AN INITIAL READOUT ON OUR STUDY
AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE END OF THIS MONTH.
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